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 Introduction 
 
The alliance between the US and Israel has for a long time been notorious and has been both 
criticized and hailed for its special nature. The current relation between the two states is 
nevertheless in a bad shape, which neither Obama nor Netanyahu tries to cover. Since 1993 where 
the Oslo accord paved the way for negotiations between Israel and Palestine, events in the Middle 
East and internationally shaped the relationship the following 20 years, but also the government 
policies of the respective countries had an impact on the relation. The Labor government in Israel, 
with Yitzhak Rabin as Prime Minister, led to international support and trust in the peace 
negotiations, but ended radically with the assassination of Rabin in 1995 (Peleg 2009:29). Shimon 
Peres succeeded Rabin, but Benjamin Netanyahu was elected Prime Minister in 1996, representing 
the right wing under the Likud party. The shift of the Israeli foreign policy has since then influenced 
the relationship between US and Israel, and caused international isolation for Israel. Nevertheless 
Israel is still governed by rightist parties, currently with Netanyahu as the Prime Minister. Despite 
the international criticism of the unwillingness to accept a Palestinian state, the prospects of such 
has been downgraded with the statement made by Netanyahu during the election campaign in 
March 2015: 
 
‘I think that anyone who goes about establishing a Palestinian state today and vacating 
territory is giving attack territory to extremist Islam to be used against the state of Israel. 
That is the real reality that has been created here in recent years. Whoever ignores this is 
putting his head in the sand’ (Lynfield 17/03 2015) 
 
The statement had immediate impact on Israel’s foreign relations, especially with the US, which has 
been serving as the protector of Israel in the UN by using its veto right as Permanent Member of the 
Security Council regarding Israel-critical resolutions. In 2009 Netanyahu acknowledged the right of 
a Palestinian state and appealed to the Palestinian leaders to start the peace negotiations (Haaretz a 
14/06 2009). The US has made several attempts to negotiate a peace solution since then and has 
defended Israel in numerous occasions. The statement made by Netanyahu regarding the prospects 
of a future Palestinian state in March 2015 made the Obama administration furious and thus tensed 
the relations between US and Israel even more. In addition, Netanyahu has been undermining the 
nuclear negotiations between Iran and the world powers since the negotiations started, which 
reveals the ideology behind the foreign policy of Israel. Iran is being portrayed as an existential 
threat to Israel, but also as a regional and military power threat. 
The external threat to Israel has been a constant influence on the foreign policy but it has changed 
radically the past 20 years. Ariel Sharon was seen as a hawkish Prime Minister by the opposition at 
the time, but he still evacuated the settlements in Gaza and strived to maintain the unique 
relationship between US and Israel (Freedman 2009:41). The current foreign policy of Israel has 
isolated Israel in the international society even more than it has been used to. It will be analyzed in 
the context of the following research question:  
 
To what extent can neorealism help clarify the relationship between US and Israel in the last 
two decades? 
 
Method and theory 
 
This project will seek to understand and explain the relationship between the US and Israel the past 
20 years, and analyze the current state of relation between the US and Israel by using IR theories. . 
The project is built on empery on crucial events that may have caused the current tension in US-
Israeli relation, and is combined with theoretical empery, think tank analyses and articles from 
newspapers. By mainly using articles from liberal papers such as Haaretz and The New York 
Times, there has been an attempt to include think tank analyses in order to make the analysis less 
biased. The analytical strategy consists of different steps. The first one is to identify the problem, 
which is the current tense relationship between the US and Israel. The next step is to choose the 
most relevant IR theory in order to analyze and explain the events that lead to the current tension. 
Finally the analysis is based on different think tanks explanations on the events chosen to be the 
most significant and influential in regards to the US-Israeli relationship. The events that are 
analyzed are chosen because of their relevance to neo-realisms explanation of international politics. 
The questions that start each chapter indicate that the chosen events have had an affect on the 
relationship, thus giving the method a deductive character. The implying hypotheses are being 
tested on a theoretical basis, and results in a conclusion that either rejects or approves them. 
Furthermore the authors, scholars and theorists chosen can be categorized as follows;  
Scholars such as Zeev Maoz, Zvi Bar'el and Hamid Mousavi are mainly critical of the US-Israel 
relations, thus the empery chosen by them reflects their opinions on the subject. Robert Freedman 
and Jalil Roshandel are less critical, and both have written extensively on matters in the Middle 
East. Finally the IR theorists chosen have different approaches to the concept of realism, as 
described below. 
     The main theory being used in the project is neo-realism and in the last chapter neo-classical 
realism has been chosen in order to identify and analyze the poor personal relationship between 
Barack Obama and Benjamin Netanyahu and its possible impact on the general relationship 
between the two states. The neoclassical realism has focus on states behavior and regard them as the 
main actors in the international system (Jackson & Sørensen 2010:65). It is therefore much different 
than Kenneth Waltz neo-realism, which draws on classical realisms perception of the international 
systems anarchy but differs by focusing more on the structural changes instead of the actions of 
state. According to Waltz the structure of the system determines and dictates the behavior of states, 
and not the other way around (Jackson & Sørensen 2010:75). Neorealism will in this project 
therefore be used in the context of the structural changes of both the Middle East and in a more 
international perspective, for example by arguing that 9/11 is one of the events that changed the 
structure of global politics thus the relationship between the US and Israel. John Mearsheimer’s 
version of neorealism, more specifically the 'offensive realism' has been chosen to analyze the 
Israeli policy towards the nuclear negotiations between the world powers and Iran. The offensive 
realism theory argues that states strive to be regional hegemons, but no state is capable of becoming 
a global hegemon (Jackson & Sørensen 2010:86). The strife between Iran and Israel and their 
political actions are somewhat applicable in the context of Mearsheimer’s 'offensive realism' theory. 
 
 
Chapter 1 
 
Analysis 
 
The US-Israeli relation 
 
Since Yitzhak Rabin died in 1995, there has only been one leftist government in Israel, namely the 
broad coalition government under Ehud Barak from 1999 to 2001. Leftist government coalitions in 
Israel differ from the right, generally speaking, by being more willing to negotiate peace agreements 
with the Palestinians. The difference between leftist and rightist governments foreign policy, can in 
this project be described by comparing the Rabin government and the current Netanyahu 
government, regarding the Palestinian issue, and thus the relationship with the US. Even though the 
Oslo Accord never became a reality it showed diplomatic flexibility, and at the same time it proved 
that Israel was willing listen to the recommendations from the US. The diplomatic goodwill by the 
Rabin government in regards to the Oslo Accord influenced Clinton’s decision to support Israel’s 
technological quality (Freedman 2009:261). The remaining 17 years have been governed by 
different rightist parties and Prime Ministers, starting with Netanyahu and the Likud party in 1996, 
then Ariel Sharon from 2001 to 2005, Ehud Olmert from 2006 to 2009 and from 2009 till now 
Netanyahu has been the Prime Ministers under different coalitions. The relationship between US 
and Israel has undergone radical changes, from having US as the mediator in the Oslo accord, and 
later the Oslo II agreement which Shimon Peres signed, to the current situation where US has 
threatened to withdraw its veto over resolutions against Israel in the UN:  
 
‘Steps that the United States has taken at the United Nations had been predicated on 
this idea that the two-state solution is the best outcome. Now our ally in these talks has 
said that they are no longer committed to that solution. That means we need to re-
evaluate our position in this matter, and that is what we will do moving forward’. 
.(Foster 19/03 2015) 
 
By using a mainstream IR theory such as neo-realism, the analysis of the US-Israeli relations under 
Netanyahu after Rabins assassination will help understand if and why the relationship changed. The 
Arab states harsh criticism of US' protection of Israel in the peace negotiations is crucial when 
analyzing Israel’s foreign policy towards US. Even though the peace negotiations with the 
Palestinians are somewhat domestic related, it is related to the foreign policy of Israel towards US, 
because of the reputation of the US in the Middle East as a mediator and ally to other Arab states. 
     During Netanyahu’s first governing period the Oslo peace accord reached an impasse despite 
pressure from the international community and the US (Peleg 2009:41). The personal relationship 
between Netanyahu and Arafat were one of the reasons that the Oslo accord never became a reality, 
but other events stagnated the peace process as well, thus putting the Clinton administration in a 
difficult mediator position. The expansion of settlements in the West Bank, Palestinian terrorism in 
Tel Aviv in 1997 and in continuation of this, Israel’s withholding of tax payments collected on 
behalf of the Palestinian Authority all contributed to the stalemate of the peace process (Freedman 
2009:262). When Madeleine Albright became secretary of state she attempted to strong-arm 
Netanyahu into a settlement freeze on the West Bank, but failed to do so. Netanyahu’s avoided this 
attempt by using his friendly relations with the Republican Party in the US congress. Nevertheless 
Bill Clinton pursued another round of negotiation in 1998, which resulted in Netanyahu and Arafat 
signing the Wye agreement, which stipulated that Israel should withdraw from 13% of the West 
Bank, on the condition that Arafat removed articles from the PLO charter that called for Israel’s 
destruction, and that he publicly called for Palestinians to stop terrorizing Israel (Freedman 
2009:264). In addition to the Wye agreement, the chief US American negotiator Dennis Ross, 
succeeded in splitting the city of Hebron in favor of the Palestinians, later called the Hebron 
agreement. Netanyahu was later widely criticized by the right wing for subjugating to US pressure 
on the Palestinian issue, which resulted in early elections put forward by Netanyahu.  
     When applying neo-realism to the analysis of the relationship between US and Israel one must 
address the structure of the international system, in this case the balance of power in the Middle 
East and the power status of US. Furthermore it is important to notice that Waltz argument, which 
says that structure dictates policy and that individual actors are subject to this, is somewhat 
applicable when analyzing the regional position Israel was in during the first Netanyahu 
government (Jackson&Sørensen 2010:86). At the time Netanyahu’s was elected prime minister for 
the first time, the US had gained a superior superpower status in the international system, but the 
deep involvement in the peace process during the Clinton administration illustrates the strategic 
interest US had in allying with Israel. It is therefore noteworthy how much the US succeeded in 
pressuring the Netanyahu government into signing the Wye agreement, even though it collided with 
the later elections. The fact that he agreed to a 13% withdrawal from the West Bank and that he 
accepted the Hebron agreement, shows the remarkable shift in the power balance between US and 
Israel from 1996 till now. Waltz argument that the prime concerns for states are security and 
survival is one of the best ways to explain the relationship between US and Israel. The annual $3 
bio US aid to Israel and the constant protection of Israel’s interest in UN is an indicator of the 
mutual interest the two states have in the alliance (Freedman 2009:289). The security dilemma 
became a huge concern once more during Netanyahu’s first government. As mentioned earlier the 
terrorist attacks in Tel Aviv in 1997 worsened the relationship between Israel and the Palestinian 
Authority and finally culminated with the second Intifada in 2000 (Freedman 2009:268). The 
terrorist attacks contributed to the already skeptical Netanyahu administration in regards to the 
surrounding Arab states. In addition to the failure of the implementation of the Oslo accord, the 
peace negotiations between Israel and Syria which had made progress during the Rabin 
administration, failed to be implemented when the Netanyahu administration proceed with the 
negotiations. The new government did not see the pledge Rabin made about withdrawal from the 
Golan Heights as binding, therefore the negotiations were halted until Ehud Barak became prime 
minister (Maoz 2006:454). The shift in the relationship between US and Israel, and thus the balance 
of power between the two started with the first Netanyahu government in 1996. Although US had a 
greater impact on Israel’s behavior at the time, the change of structure was already beginning and 
gained momentum from 9/11 and on.  
 
9/11 and the impact on US-Israel relation 
 
How did the 'war on terror' affect Israel’s power position in the region? 
 When Ehud Barak became prime minister, the foreign policy of Israel became more focused on the 
unbreakable alliance between US and Israel, beginning with the Camp David II summit in 2000. 
Barak offered generous concessions compared to earlier peace offers made by Israel, but the 
negotiations broke down once again. This time Clinton sympathized with Israel and Barak, and 
blamed Arafat for the stalemate (Freedman 2009:266). Later that year, the opposition leader Ariel 
Sharon, visited the Temple Mount in Jerusalem, which in combination with the Camp David failure 
sparked the second Intifada. The massive terror attacks would later become an influential political 
factor that would strengthen the ties between US and Israel once again.  
     After 9/11 the Bush administration new Middle East policy had two important goals; to promote 
the war on terror and by extension to support the democratization in the region. These goals had to 
be pursued by trying to solve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. By solving the conflict the US could 
gain Muslim support for fighting terrorists in Afghanistan, and at the same time diminish the 
tension and terror attacks in Israel (Freedman 2009:269). The period after 9/11 gave the US-Israeli 
relationship a new dimension by cooperating actively on the fight against terrorism. The US put 
Hamas, Islamic Jihad and Hizbollah on the terror list, which was a sign that the US and Israel now 
had common enemies. At the same time George Bush stated his support for a two state solution at 
the UN and pushed for foreign minister Shimon Peres and Arafat to meet, against Prime Minister 
Sharon will. The US effort on pushing both sides to peace during the years after 9/11 ended in 
failure, mostly because of ongoing terrorist attacks from Palestinians, but also because of Israel’s 
reluctance to accept Arafat as a peace partner. When Mahmoud Abbas won the PA election and 
became the leader of Fatah, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice put pressure on Ariel Sharon to let 
Gaza have a democratic election in connection with the Israeli withdrawal from the territory. 
(Freedman 2009:284). From 9/11 to 2006 the Bush administrations relationship with Israel had 
undergone different changes from the Clinton period. The cooperation between the US and Israel on 
the fight against terrorism strengthened the relationship in regards to national security, but the 
pressure from the US on Israeli withdrawal from Gaza and the results that were Hamas leadership in 
Gaza, surprised both the US and Israel, and put the security issue back on Israel’s first priority. 
Simultaneously Sharon decided to build the security wall in the West Bank in 2003 as a counter 
terrorist strategy, and ordered the assassinations of Hamas leaders (Maoz 2006:266). The domestic 
strategies had an impact on future relationship with the US, thus influencing the forthcoming 
developments of the Israeli foreign policy. 
     Following developments can be used analytically in a neo-realistic context, to explain the 
relationship between the US and Israel during the Bush and Sharon administrations; The terror 
attack on world trade center, the US decision to put pressure on Israel in regards to Gaza and 
democratic election, and the US wars on terror in Afghanistan and Iraq. When 9/11 happened the 
Bush administration turned its attention to the Middle East once again. US and Israel now had a 
common enemy that threatened to destroy them, namely al-Qaeda (Lieberman 2009:301). The 
international system had changed in terms of a new security threat to western democracies, and it 
affected the future decisions that would highlight the international anarchy. When the US decided to 
prioritize the Israeli-Palestinian conflict it deeply affected the decision-making of the Sharon 
administration. The US relied on Israeli cooperation in counter terrorism, but nevertheless paved the 
way for Hamas to lead Gaza. In the optics of neo-realism it underlines the concept of 'self-help' that 
Israel later availed them of when Sharon had the security wall build;  
 
‘Neo-realists argue that international anarchy necessarily tends towards tension, conflict 
and the unavoidable possibility of war for three main reasons. In the first place, as states 
are separate, autonomous and formally equal political units, they must ultimately rely on 
their own resources to realize their interests. International anarchy therefore results in a 
system of 'self-help', because states cannot count on anyone else to 'take care of them'. 
Second, relationships between and amongst states are always characterized by 
uncertainty and suspicion. This is best explained through the security dilemma. 
Although self-help forces states to ensure security and survival by building up sufficient 
military capacity to deter other states from attacking them, such actions are liable to to 
be interpreted as hostile or aggressive. Uncertainty about motives therefore forces states 
to treat all other states as enemies, meaning that permanent insecurity is the inescapable 
consequence of living in conditions of anarchy. Third, conflict is also encouraged by the 
fact that states are primarily concerned about maintaining or improving their position 
relative to other states; that is, about making relative gains’ (Heywood 2014:63). 
 
 
Sharon’s decision to withdraw from Gaza in order to get the US acceptance of a ”temporary defense 
wall” in the West Bank can be seen as a diplomatic maneuver. Bush stated that  
 
‘As the government of Israel has stated, the barrier being erected by Israel should be a 
security rather than a political barrier, should be temporary, and therefore not prejudice 
any final status issues including final borders, and its route should take into account, 
consistent with security needs, its impact on Palestinians not engaged in terror activities’ 
(Freedman 2009:281). 
 
The US support for Sharon’s security wall was in large accepted because of the withdrawal from 
Gaza. The security dilemma that the withdrawal would mean for Israel was counterbalanced by the 
building of the security wall. As the neo-realistic theory dictates, the self-help and the security and 
survival that it implies, was seen as hostile and aggressive by the Palestinians in regards to the 
security wall. Furthermore states are concerned about maintaining or improving their position 
relative to other states, which the security wall is a proof of. If Israel were to withdraw from Gaza 
without improving its security and survival in any other way, it would be more vulnerable to 
Palestinian terror attacks than before.  
     The US wars in Afghanistan and Iraq made the American presence in the Middle East 
significant. The decision to ignore the UN and go to war in Iraq, was a sign of international 
anarchy, and can be argued as a result of changing structures in the international system (Jackson & 
Sørensen 2010:75). The war on terror initiated and lead by the US meant that Israel was an 
important ally that would be supported in its own war on terror. A statement from Cabinet Secretary 
in Sharon’s administration confirms the position of Israel as a consequence of 9/11; 
   
‘After the attacks, the entire international establishment, headed by the U.S., 
fundamentally changed its approach to mass terror attacks. This also increased the 
maneuvering room for Israel, which half a year after Sept. 11 embarked on Operation 
Defensive Shield in Judea and Samaria with the Americans' support. Bush declared, 
you're either with us or you're with the terrorists. Israel found itself on the right side. 
Terror was no longer seen as legitimate’ (Verter 09/10/2011) 
 
The fact that US had two wars to focus on during the Sharon administration made the focus shift 
from pushing for a peace agreement to focusing on the insurgents in Iraq in 2005.  
As the structure of the international system changed with 9/11, Israel benefited from the 
improvement in US-Israeli relations. Being the ally of a superpower in the war against a common 
enemy influenced the foreign policy under Ehud Olmert, namely the decision to go to war against 
Hizbollah in Lebanon.  
 
The Second Lebanon war and the deterrence strategy 
 
In the following chapter the neo-realistic version by John Mearsheimer is being used as the main 
analytical tool to understand the development of the Israeli foreign policy, both toward the Arab 
states but also toward the US. Even though Mearsheimer agrees with Waltz that states compete for 
power because of the international anarchy, and that states seek hegemony, it is impossible for a 
state to be a global hegemon, simply because the world is too big (Jackson & Sørensen 2010:85). In 
that context the decision to once again adopt a deterrent foreign policy, and thus go to war against 
Hizbollah in Lebanon can be analyzed. 
     In 2006 the US had entered its third year in the war in Iraq and its fifth year in Afghanistan. By 
using its status as a superpower and declaring war against terror, the US had a similar deterrent 
foreign policy as Israel, and even declared Israel’s enemy, Hizbollah, a terror organization after 
9/11. Furthermore Hizbollah’s alliance with Iran, which Bush pointed out being one of three in the 
axis of evil, gave the US and Israel a common interest in weakening Hizbollah in Lebanon (The 
Economist a  31/01/2002) It was therefore with the full support of the Bush administration that the 
new prime minister of Israel, Ehud Olmert, decided to go to war against Hizbollah in Lebanon in 
2006 (Lieberman 2009:320). Hizbollah raison d'être came when Israel went to war in Lebanon in 
1982, and has since build up its reputation as being the enemy of Israel, while at the same time 
serving Syrian, Iranian and Palestinian interests (Lieberman 2009:329). The escalation started when 
Hizbollah took two Israeli soldiers as prisoners and killed three Israeli soldiers in a cross boarder 
attack in July 2006. At the same time Israel was dealing with rockets fired from Gaza into Israel and 
an Israeli soldier held hostage by Hamas (BBC 14/07/2006). Israel decided to retaliate with a full-
blown attack in Lebanon, which lasted 33 days and killed 1100 Lebanese and 43 Israelis (Mousavi 
2015:130). The Israeli discourse at the time was almost identical to the famous ”axis of evil” term 
made by Bush 5 years earlier, when warning the international community that Syria, Iran, Hizbollah 
and Hamas formed an ”axis of terror” (BBC 14/07/2015). The war ended with UN resolution 1701 
that called for a 'complete halt of acts of aggression, especially those committed by Hizbollah and 
the militia acts on behalf of Israel' (Knesset 2009). What led to the Israeli decision to make a 
military attack on Hizbollah in Lebanon is the part that this chapter aims at analyzing, using 
Mearsheimers offensive realism theory. At the time that Hizbollah killed and kidnapped Israeli 
soldiers the strategy of Ehud Olmert’s administration was coordinated with the Bush administration 
in order to get as much support as possible. When deciding on a deterrence strategy Olmert weighed 
the costs and benefits of the upcoming operation in Lebanon and decided that Hizbollah could be 
threatened to disarm and surrender rather quickly, due to Israel’s military strength (Lieberman 
2009:320). The deterrence strategy of Israel has a long history and goes back to the early 1950s, but 
during Ariel Sharon’s administration the deterrence strategy had only been used domestically 
against the Palestinians (Lieberman 2009:323). It is therefore interesting to look at the motives of 
both Israel and the US in the context of the Lebanon war and analyze how the relationship was 
affected by it.  
     The US Senate passed resolution 534 which ”Condemn Hizbollah and Hamas and their state 
sponsors and supporting Israel’s right to self-defense”. Furthermore Bush publically supported 
Israel by calling ‘Hizbollah the root of the problem’ (Mousavi 2015:131). In addition the US 
decided to support Israel on the ground on different levels, for example sending JP-8 Jet fuel 
shipment to Israel which amounted to $210 mio. On July 24th it was reported that the US was going 
to send Bunker Buster Bombs to Israel. The public support if Israel’s decision to hit Hizbollah and 
Lebanon combined with the military support and coordination between the US and Israel reveals the 
common interest in fighting Hizbollah among others. A Pentagon official talked to the New Yorker 
in August 2006 and stated ”the White House has been agitating for some time to find a reason for a 
preemptive blow against Hezbollah. It was our intent to have Hezbollah diminished, and now we 
have someone else doing it” (Mousavi 20015:132). The common interest of the US and Israel in 
diminishing Hizbollah’s influence in Lebanon had connections to the growing tension between the 
US and Iran over its nuclear program at the time, and shortly after the Lebanon war ended in 2006 
the US sanctioned the Iranian bank, Saderat, because of its connection to Hizbollah (Whale 07/11 
2014). The alliance between the US and Israel and their common opponent and strategy against 
Hizbollah and Iran, is a classic move according to Mearsheimer’s offensive realism, describes as 
following by Peter Toft: 
 
'Mearsheimer contributes to the realist power debate by going to great lengths to clarify 
his views on the subject. Dividing state capabilities into latent (economy and population) 
and actual power (military), Mearsheimer argues that military power is most important 
when analyzing world politics because it is 'the ultimo ratio of international politics'. 
Furthermore, he argues that land power is crucial because land armies are necessary to 
control territory ¾ the most important asset in a world of territorial states...War is the 
principal way of gaining power. Even though it is costly, Mearsheimer argues that 
rational states may choose war if the benefits outweigh the costs. Most importantly, a 
successful war might oust a rival thereby making the aggressor safer. Short of war, 
blackmail offers another option to make relative gains by threatening a rival to make 
concessions. Blackmail is, however, only effective against minor states as major states 
are able to resist....Balancing represents the most important way of checking aggression 
by deterring or fighting a potential aggressor through internal build-up and/or via 
alliance formation. In tune with most realist alliance literature, Mearsheimer argues that 
alliances are attractive because the burden of handling an aggressor is shared. However, 
alliances are also slow to form and tend to be inefficient because of collective action 
problems. The drawbacks of alliances make buck-passing alluring. Buck-passing implies 
passing on the burden of handling an aggressor to someone else, hoping that they will be 
able to check the aggressor. Passing the buck is appealing because if conflict should 
break out, the buck-passer may sit safely on the bench, while the balance of power 
hopefully shifts to its advantage. As such, buck-passing implies a strong offensive 
element. Buck-passing is also risky, however, because the eventual buck-catcher may be 
defeated and leave the buck-passer alone to confront the aggressor. Conversely, if the 
buck-catcher successfully stops the aggressor, it may end up stronger and upset the 
balance of power to the disadvantage of the buck-passe' (Toft 2005). 
 
In the case of the geopolitical and security interests of both Israel and the US at the time of the 
Lebanon war, the description by Toft of Mearsheimers offensive realism, the deterring and 
checking of aggression from Hizbollah seems applicable. The ”units” behavior in the structural 
system (the US and Israel) was to use war as a way of gaining power against Hizbollah (and Iran). 
The relationship between the US and Israel strengthened because of the alliance against common 
enemies. For Israel it was vital to have an ally in the US in order to justify the war action and to get 
military support, and for the US the 'buck-passing' as describes above benefited the US, by letting 
Israel check the aggressor. The alliance therefore benefited both parties at the short run and made 
the US influence on the Middle East stronger, and at the same time it strengthened the military 
hegemon status of both Israel and the US in the region. The argument about 'units' behavior is a 
product of the structure of the system is an argument worth testing in the case of the Middle East at 
the time. The tension between Iran and the West had already begun, due to information revealed on 
the future nuclear capability of Iran. Hamas had won the election in Gaza and Hizbollah was 
growing stronger in Lebanon. Both organizations were allies of Iran and got financial and military 
support from Iran. The 'units' in this case, being the US and Israel were reacting to the changes of 
the structure in the Middle East, thus affecting their behavior. The ongoing 'war on terror' with the 
result of US led wars in Afghanistan and Iraq can be argued as making Israel the most important 
ally of the US once again. The regional influence of Israel at the time was strong but relied heavily 
on military and financial support from the US. Nevertheless the common deterrent policies of both 
countries were important in the US interests and foreign policy toward the Middle East. The 
military capability, goals and actions of both the US and Israel can thus be explained with 
Mearsheimers offensive realism. The new US policy toward the Middle East relied in some ways on 
Israeli engagement in fighting Iran, Hizbollah and Syria, in order to make US influence more 
significant in the long run, especially with the challenge of Iran’s nuclear plans that would later 
become much more complex with Ahmadinejad as the President. 
     The outcome of the Lebanon war was later to become a failure in the eyes of Israel on different 
levels. First of all the war did not succeed in defeating or hurting Hizbollah significantly, when 
looking at the position of the current status of Hizbollah. The organization has more than 100.000 
rockets available, more than seven times the amount during the Lebanon war, and is now 
considered one of the main threats to Israel alongside Iran (Harel 26/04 2015). The miscalculation 
of the wars in Iraq and Lebanon and the realization of military limits from the US and Israel was not 
obvious at the time, but it affected the future relationship when the structures of the system changed 
once again. The new leaders of the two states, Barack Obama and Benjamin Netanyahu, had 
different approaches toward political solutions concerning the nuclear program of Iran and the two-
state solution, compared to earlier administrations. The structural changes that emerged at the time 
will be analyzed deeper in the following chapter. 
 
 
 
Chapter 2 
 
The Iranian threat 
 
How has the nuclear negotiations with Iran influenced the US-Israeli relations? 
 
The power status of Israel as a nuclear hegemon in the Middle East during the 1990s is an important 
factor when analyzing how the nuclear negotiations between Iran and the world powers affected the 
US-Israeli relationship in a offensive realism context. Nuclear capability has for a long time been 
argued as the main deterrent and protection of an all out aggression against Israel, even though 
Israel never publicaclly admittet to having this weapon (Maoz 2006:309). Israeli politicians have 
always been aware of the existential threat a nuclear-armed adversary in the Middle East would 
pose to the states existence, mainly because of the size of the country (David 2009:310). In the 
context of the structure of the system and the units behavior dependence on it, the Iranian President 
in 1999, Mohammad Khatami, expressed concerns over Israel’s nuclear weapons and strongly 
supported ridding the Middle East of nuclear weapons, alongside King Fahd of Saudi Arabia (Sinha 
& Beachy 02/04/2015). At the time Iran’s nuclear programs development was very limited but had 
begun four years earlier with the signing of a $800 mio. contract with Russia on constructing water 
reactors in Iran. Iran dismissed allegations from the US and Israel that it was seeking nuclear arms 
with the deal;  
 
'Those American and Israeli officials who used The Times to sublimate their 
mischievous political agenda know very well that Iran does not and will not, in light of 
its own national interest, engage in a nuclear weapon program' (The New York Times 
08/01/1995)  
 
In 2002 an uranium enrichment plant in the city of Natanz in Iran was discovered, along with a 
heavy water plant in Arak but it was not till 2006 that the security council pushed for sanctions 
against Iran (Gootman 24/12/2006). In 2005 Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was elected President in Iran 
and the discourse of the regime became more aggressive, publically calling for the destruction of 
Israel and describing the Holocaust as a myth (Sinha & Beachy 02/04/2015). This chapter aims at 
explaining the consequences of the diplomatic negotiations between Iran and the world powers and 
its affect on the US-Israeli relations. It will start with an analysis on the negotiations impact on 
Israeli reactions from a neo-realistic view, and move on to analyze the current relationship between 
the US and Israel. 
 
 
Regional balance of power-Iran and Israel 
 
During the final year of the Bush administration a joint cyber attack on Iran’s nuclear program 
between the US and Israel was initiated (Sanger 01/06/2012). Its goal was to halt the process of the 
Iranian nuclear program as an alternative to a military attack on the Iranian nuclear plants, which 
President Bush thought would worsen the regions stability. Obama inherited the cyber attack 
operation called 'Olympic Games', but in 2010 the bug planted in Natanz was exposed (Sanger 
01/06/2012). The coordination between the US and Israel on the Iranian threat at the beginning of 
Obama and Netanyahu’s offices showed a continuing interest in working together on common 
goals. However the two states differences in priorities and ways to secure national interests in 
regard to Iran’s nuclear program was soon revealed. Some of the disagreement between the US and 
Israel can be argued is derived from the structural changes in the region that the nuclear threat from 
Iran posed. 
     In his speech at the Bar Ilan University in 2009 Netanyahu made it clear that the threat from Iran 
was real and that it was a top priority for his administration to handle;  
 
'The Iranian threat still is before us in full force, as it became quite clear yesterday. The 
greatest danger to Israel, to the Middle East, and to all of humanity, is the encounter 
between extremist Islam and nuclear weapons. I discussed this with President Obama on 
my visit to Washington, and will be discussing it next week on my visit with European 
leaders. I have been working tirelessly for many years to form an international front 
against Iran arming itself with nuclear armaments' (Haaretz a 14/06/2009).  
 
The newly elected Prime Minister of Israel had warned against Iran since his column in the Israeli 
newspaper Yehidot Ahronot in 1993, where his remarks in Iran was not much different from the 
ones in the Bar Ilan speech in 2009; 
 
'The most dangerous threat to Israel's existence does not lie in the Arab countries – but 
in Iran... The rulers of Iran have said repeatedly that they will have an Islamic bomb and 
that its first target is Israel..We can't rely on the assumption that rational considerations 
concerning a possible Israeli response will intimidate this fanatical mentality. 
Deterrence alone is not a sufficient Israeli response to the danger of the Muslim bomb. 
Israel must act decisively to thwart this threat that endangers our very existence' 
(Druckman 03/03/2015).  
 
Netanyahu’s persistence in dealing with the threat from Iran and making it a top priority for the 
international society only grew during the following years of his administration. In his UN speech 
the same year as he took office, he declared that;  
 
'The greatest threat facing the world today is the marriage between religious fanaticism 
and the weapons of mass destruction. The most urgent challenge facing this body is to 
prevent the tyrants of Tehran from acquiring nuclear weapons. Are the member states of 
the United Nations up to that challenge? Will the international community confront a 
despotism that terrorizes its own people as they bravely stand up for freedom?' (Haaretz 
b 24/09/2009) 
 
The shift in the US policy toward the region became clear when Barack Obama was elected 
President in the US. Obama promised in 2008 to eventually pull out troops of Iraq, thus ending the 
war (Pavlich 11/08/2014). The new top priority was ending the Israeli-Palestinian conflict with 
more strict demands on Israeli settlements;  
 
'In my conversations with Prime Minister Netanyahu, I was very clear about the need to 
stop settlements, to make sure that we are stopping the building of outposts . . . to 
alleviate some of the pressures that the Palestinian people are under in terms of travel 
and commerce' (Kessler 29/05/2009) 
 The dispute about the settlement activity and the later attempt from John Kerry to make a 
framework for peace negotiations became another dispute that would affect the US-Israeli relation. 
It will be analyzed in the final chapter.  
     Thirdly the new approach toward dealing with Iran was much different from the tough stance the 
Bush administration had. In 2009 Obama made an unprecedented appeal to Iran and the future 
relationship between the two states;  
 
'My administration is now committed to diplomacy that addresses the full range of issues 
before us. For nearly three decades relations between our nations have been strained. But 
at this holiday we are reminded of the common humanity that binds us together. This 
process will not be advanced by threats. We seek instead engagement that is honest and 
grounded in mutual respect' (Black 20/03/2009).  
 
The difference between the Obama administration and the Netanyahu administration became clear 
soon, as their quotes from 2009 on Iran reveal.  
 
 
 
The growing regional influence of Iran 
 
Israel’s use of deterrence as a defense mechanism since the 1950s only grew stronger when it 
obtained nuclear weapons in the 1960s. Even though it has still not been proved that Israel 
possesses nuclear weapons it is a well-known fact among scholars and politicians that in some ways 
has benefited Israel in its deterrence policy toward the surrounding Arab states (Maoz 2006:341). 
On the other hand it has arguably influenced the arms race in the region during the years, especially 
the Iranian nuclear project (Maoz 2006:337). The interest of Iran in becoming a regional hegemon 
is not more unusual than Saudi Arabia or any other powerful state in a region, as per Mearsheimers 
assumption on power seeking among states (Jackson & Sørensen 2010:86). The dispute over Iran’s 
alleged attempt to acquire nuclear weapons can be explained when analyzing the changing structure 
of the system in the region. In 2009 the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq had drained the economy and 
the will power of the Americans, which led to Obamas promise to pull out troops of Iraq during his 
embassy. Iran’s new proxy in Gaza, Hamas, gave the Iranian regime a chance to influence the 
situation in Israel by arming and supporting the groups fight against Israel. The Gaza war in 
2008/2009 worsened the Israeli-Iranian relation, when Israel accused Iran of arming Hamas with 
long-range rockets and financial backing. The allegations were later supported when Israeli F-16 
jets bombed convoys in Sudan with more than 120 tons weapons, allegedly destined to Hamas from 
Iran (Szrom 27/03/2009). Two years later the Arab Spring came, regimes in the Middle East were 
toppled and replaced. It later resulted in growing tensions between Shias and Sunnis in the region, 
with the civil war in Syria and the Sunni uprising in Iraq. Iran’s role as the leader and supporter of 
Shias in the wars, caused further power dispute between Saudi Arabia and Iran, in some parts due to 
the proxy wars in Syria, Iraq and recently Yemen, but also because of Iran’s nuclear program 
(Younis 29/03/2015). The structure of the system in which Iran, Israel and the US were involved in 
is therefore important when analyzing the impact of the Iranian nuclear negotiations on the US-
Israeli relationship. During Ahmadinejad’s Presidency from 2009 to 2013 the Iranian regime 
continued its nuclear program and insisted on the right to continue its nuclear energy program for 
peaceful purposes. The rhetoric at the time was aggressive towards Israel and the US, who 
Ahmadinejad criticized for trying to destabilize the region;  
 
'Washington is seeking to persuade other countries to recognize the Zionist regime, and 
that such recognition is likely to destabilize the entire region. Tehran will fight such 
nefarious attempts. If we succeed in vanquishing the enemy in its plan, colonialism will 
fail forever...this is a historical battle' (Ynet News 30/07/2011) 
 
 Secretary of Iran’s Expediency Council was later quoted saying that; 
 
'The West lacks effective tools to impose effective sanctions and embargoes against 
Tehran. Actually, Iran is a big bite for the West, which will stick to its throat and make it 
choke to death. I believe that sanctioning Iran is not possible for the westerners at all' 
(YNet News 30/07/2011) 
 
The growing tensions between the US-Israel and Iran was further affected by the assassination of 
Iranian nuclear scientists Mostafa Ahmadi Roshan in 2012 and Majid Shahriari in 2010, which Iran 
accused Israel and the US of (Cowell & Gladstone 11/01/2012). The dispute over Iran’s nuclear 
program once again culminated when the United Nations agency revealed evidence which stated 
that the program ‘make a credible case that Iran has carried out activities relevant to the 
development of a nuclear device at its Parchin military base and that the project may still be under 
way' (Sinha & Beachy 02/04/2015). It resulted in western powers sanctioning Iran’s military 
purchase, trade and financial transactions. Furthermore ships to and from Iran would be investigated 
and Iran was banned from investing in other countries nuclear plants (Sinha & Beachy 02/04/2015). 
The reaction from President Ahmadinejad to the sanctions were symptomatic with the tense 
relationship between Iran and the world powers at the time; 'It's high time for some people to open 
their eyes and adapt themselves to real changes that are under way. Definitely, we will show a 
reaction that will put them to shame, like always' (Bozorgmehr & Labott 16/02/2010).  
     Netanyahu’s warning against the severity of a nuclear Iran was in line with his advice to the 
Obama administration on dealing with Iran. An official quoted Netanyahu as telling Vice President 
Joe Biden that; 
 
‘Only a credible military threat would prevent Iran from developing an atomic bomb. 
The only way to ensure Iran does not obtain nuclear weapons is by creating a credible 
threat of military action against it if it does not halt its race to acquire a nuclear bomb. 
Sanctions are important. They are increasing pressure on Iran. But so far there has not 
been any change in the behavior of Iran and upgrading of international pressure is 
necessary' (Roshandel & Lean 2011:31) 
 
The response from the US Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates, echoed the stance made by Obama 
in his video message to Iran in 2009;  
 
‘I disagree that only a credible military threat can get Iran to take the action that it needs 
to end its nuclear weapons program. We are prepared to do what is necessary. But at this 
point we continue to believe that the political, economic approach that we are taking is 
in fact having an impact on Iran' (Roshandel & Lean 2011:32). 
 
The difference in the US and the Israeli political approach toward the Iranian nuclear program 
became clear, thus making it possible to analyze the changed structure and the affect on the US-
Israeli relation.  
 
Changing structures and alliances 
 
In 2010 the international whistle-blowing organization, Wikileaks, revealed secret documents on 
private conversations between world leaders. The documents contained information on pressure 
from Saudi Arabia on US to launch a military strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities, and Egyptian 
espionage on Iran (Roshandel & Lean 2011:32). The growing struggle for regional power in the 
Middle East is a classic neo-realistic argument on states behavior, in this case not only limiting the 
regional power seeking to Iran and Israel, but also the other major players such as Saudi Arabia and 
Egypt.  
     When looking at the forthcoming years of negotiations between Iran and World powers it is clear 
that Israel is still strongly dependent on the alliance with US, when using military power to deter 
other states or to maintain its regional power status. Without the backing of the US, Israel could not 
go through with a military operation against Iran. During the Bush administration the security issues 
of Israel were being prioritized stronger, having the support of the operations in Gaza against 
Hamas and the war against Lebanon. The Obama administrations new foreign policy that sought 
diplomatic solutions instead of military solutions meant that Israel could no longer rely on the 
unconditional support of the US. Even though Israel sees a nuclear Iran as a possible nuclear war 
against it, it has not been capable of convincing the US to consider military actions or even toughen 
the sanctions on Iran the recent years. When Iran elected Hassan Rouhani as the new President in 
2013 the political course of Iran changed. The new government was more open-minded to 
negotiating a deal with the World powers in order to remove the sanctions that had skyrocketed the 
inflation, depreciated the currency and affected the Iranian population deeply (Hakimian 
23/05/2012). The 18 months ongoing negotiations ended with a framework for a deal between Iran 
and the World powers, which is expected to be signed in the summer of 2015 (Rayman 
03/04/2015). 
Netanyahu made his disappointment with the framework of the Iranian nuclear deal clear in the 
medias afterwards;  
 
'A better deal would roll back Iran’s vast nuclear infrastructure, and require Iran to stop 
its aggression in the region, its terror worldwide and its calls and actions to annihilate 
the state of Israel, Netanyahu said on CNN. That’s a better deal. It’s achievable. The 
deal should have included a provision to curtail Iranian efforts to develop an 
international ballistic missile. Those missiles are only used for you (US). No one is 
asking Iran in this deal to stop its aggression in the region' (McCarthy 05/04/2015). 
 
Netanyahu refers to the aggression of Iran in the region and its terror worldwide, which leads to the 
next step in the analysis; the new role of Iran in the region. As the Israeli Middle East analyst Zvi 
Bar'el concludes, the impact on the international scene that Iran’s nuclear program has had, makes 
Iran a regional superpower already. The deal made Obama and the congress clash over the sanctions 
severity, caused debate within the Obama administration on whether Iran should be seen as a 
partner in stabilizing Afghanistan and Iraq, created further between Arab states about Iranian 
hegemony, and finally damaged relations between China and the US, having the US selling arms to 
Taiwan in order to strong-arm China into supporting the sanctions (Bar'el a 21/02 2010). Zvi Bar'el 
continues to conclude;  
 'Therefore, even before manufacturing a single bomb, Iran has become a regional superpower 
influencing international policy. To preserve its position as a country around which the world 
revolves, it does not even need to build a bomb. It is enough for it to unnerve the world over and 
over by, for example, announcing the gradual enrichment of uranium from 20 percent to 40 percent 
to 60 percent to 80 percent. Thus it can perpetuate the dilemma faced by Western intelligence 
services, which are unable to determine whether Iran has decided to build a nuclear weapon. In 
other words, they are still incapable of identifying Iran's interest in developing a nuclear bomb' 
(Bar'el a 21/02/2010). 
 
The analysis on Iran’s new role in the region and the fear it has spread, was later confirmed when 
Wikileaks revealed that both Egypt and Saudi Arabia fear a nuclear Iran, but not only because of its 
military capability. Just as Israel they fear that Iran will now become a key player in solving the 
ongoing civil wars and conflicts in the region. The legitimacy it will gain from a deal will further 
increase its oil export and make Iran a broker in regional conflicts, because of its strategic influence 
in Syria, Lebanon, Iraq and Yemen (Bar'el b 12/05/2015). The ongoing dispute over Iran’s nuclear 
program that ended with a framework for a deal has shifted the alliances in the region, benefiting 
Iran’s power position at the expense of the Iranian economy. 
     The relationship between the US and Israel has been affected by the Obama administrations new 
Middle East approach, mostly its decision to deal with Iran on a diplomatic basis, thus 
strengthening its regional influence. Structural changes in the region, such as the rise of ISIS in Iraq 
and Syria, have also contributed to the change in the relationship between the US and Israel, since it 
gave the US and Iran a common enemy and therefore a shared strategic interest. Both Iran and the 
US are interested in preserving the current government in Iraq and fighting ISIS, which made an 
opening for a future cooperation between the US and Iran in dealing with ISIS. The US Secretary of 
State said that; 'I think we are open to any constructive process here that could minimize the 
violence, hold Iraq together — the integrity of the country — and eliminate the presence of outside 
terrorist forces that are ripping it apart' (Rezaian & Gearan 16/06/2014). Even though military 
cooperation has not been discussed, it is a sign that the US could be interested in strengthening the 
relationship with Iran, and even buck pass the strategic challenge facing both states in Iraq. The 
diplomatic solution with Iran on its nuclear program has shown that the US does not agree with 
Israel’s desire to punish Iran as much as possible, and it has its own interests to look out for. If Iran 
can become a sober regional power that can help the US achieve its geopolitical goals, the US will 
prioritize its own national interests over those of Israel. The security challenge of Israel is tied to the 
alliance between Iran, Hizbollah and Hamas, with Iran as the main financial and military supporter, 
which gives Israel a much more tense relationship with Iran than the US experiences. From a neo-
realistic approach it is therefore not surprising that the structural changes in the Middle East has 
caused a possible renewal/changes of alliances, interests and regional power hegemony. The 
framework for the nuclear deal was made despite the well-known opposition of Israel and 
Netanyahu’s assessment that the deal will;  
 
'Threaten the survival of Israel. Just two days ago, Iran said that 'the destruction of israel is non-
negotiable' and in these fateful days Iran is accelerating the arming of its terror proxies to attack 
Israel. This deal would legitimize Iran’s nuclear program, bolster Iran’s economy, and increase 
Iran’s aggression and terror throughout the Middle East and beyond' (The Times of Israel 
03/04/2015) 
      
Even though political discourse should not be seen as rational and objective rating of challenges, the 
alliance between Iran, Hamas and Hizbollah gives Israel a legitimate reason to fear future wars if 
Iran’s regional position is empowered. The Obama administrations decision to pursue a diplomatic 
solution with Iran, without knowing exactly how long it would take Iran to develop a bomb if it 
decides to violate the deal, and its willingness to jeopardize the relationship with Israel, is a sign of 
a change in the geopolitical interests of the US (Roshandel & Lean 2011:57). This illustrates the 
current US-Israeli relation which officials, analysts and politicians from a wide spectrum have been 
called the worst in many years. Another aspect that has caused the current bad relationship is the 
Obama administrations demands to freeze Israeli settlements and the later pursuit by John Kerry to 
establish a framework deal for peace negotiations. The following chapter will try to analyze the 
dispute between the US and Israel over the settlements from a classical realistic view.  
 
Chapter 3 
 
The Israeli settlements and the framework deal 
 
How has the expansion of the settlements in the West Bank influenced the US-Israel relation? 
 
When Netanyahu declared the two state solution dead the day before the recent election in Israel, it 
was a clear sign of a new strategy from the Prime Minister and his party (Lynfield 17/03/2015). The 
contrast to his Bar Ilan speech in 2009 where he endorsed a two state solution was significant, but it 
comes as no surprise when looking at the developments and actions taken during the past two 
Netanyahu administrations. The expansion of the settlements have been highlighted as the main 
obstacle to peace by both the Palestinians and the US, and when Obama was elected President in 
2009 it became clear that new demands and policies toward Israel would come (Abrams July 2011). 
Obama reached out to the Muslim world with his Cairo speech in 2009 in which he endorsed the 
two state solution and made his opinion on Israeli settlements clear;  
 
'This construction violates previous agreements and undermines efforts to achieve peace. 
It is time for these settlements to stop. It is also undeniable that the Palestinian people -- 
Muslims and Christians -- have suffered in pursuit of a homeland. For more than 60 
years they have endured the pain of dislocation. Many wait in refugee camps in the West 
Bank, Gaza and neighboring lands for a life of peace and security that they have never 
been able to lead..They endure the daily humiliations -- large and small -- that come 
with occupation. So let there be no doubt: The situation for the Palestinian people is 
intolerable. America will not turn our backs on the legitimate Palestinian aspiration for 
dignity, opportunity and a state of their own' (CNN 04/06/2009) 
 
The following years events did not reflect Netanyahu and Obamas aspiration for the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict, on the contrary it worsened the relationship between the US and Israel, both on 
a personal and a state level. This chapter will use classical realism to explain how both parties 
handled the issue of the settlements.  
 
 
 
 
Obamas settlements freeze demands 
 
During Netanyahu’s first administration the settlements became an issue that influenced the 
relationship between the US and Israel. The Oslo Peace II accord never became a reality in some 
parts due to continuing in settlement buildings in the West Bank and in East Jerusalem (Freedman 
2009:262). Netanyahu rejected the appeal from the US Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, to 
make a time-out in settlement construction in the occupied territories. Albright issued an ultimatum 
in 1998 to Israel to accept 13% withdrawal from the West Bank, but failed to succeed because of 
Netanyahu’s support from the Republicans in the US Congress (Freedman 2009:263). Netanyahu 
finally agreed to the withdrawal, on the condition that 3% of the area would be prohibited for the 
Palestinians to build in. During the Bush administration the settlements were also criticized on 
numerous occasions, and a freeze to settlement construction was put forward as a key to reaching 
peace. In addition the Bush administration negotiated Sharon’s plan to withdraw from Gaza which 
led Bush 'reward' the initiative by rejecting Palestinian 'right of return', a well known issue for 
Israel, and supported Israel’s right to fight terrorism (Freedman 2009:282). As mentioned before the 
Bush administration also supported Israel’s war in Lebanon in 2006 and its operations against 
Hamas. The Israeli settlements in the occupied territories have therefore been an issue the past 20 
years, but the policies of the two governments under Netanyahu’s leadership influenced the 
relationship with the US in a more profound way than before.  
   When using classical realism, such as Morgenthau, to analyze the tension that the settlement issue 
has made during the past 5 years, the self-interest of both Obama and Netanyahu is an important 
aspect to have in mind. It is clear that the settlements in the West Bank and East Jerusalem have 
been a much more important element during Netanyahu’s recent governments, than during Ehud 
Olmert and Ariel Sharon. Even though the security wall was built during the Sharon administration, 
he withdrew from Gaza and removed settlements from Bethlehem (Freedman 2009:260). Ehud 
Olmert was willing to withdraw from 90 % of the West Bank in his proposal to Mahmoud Abbas, 
which showed a diplomatic flexibility regarding the West Bank that Netanyahu would not show 
during his two administrations. Netanyahu, on the contrary has protected the settlements as much as 
he could. When Obama first demanded the settlements to be freezed as a condition for the US to be 
a peace broker, the demand was met with anger and refusal in the right wing coalition of 
Netanyahu, but he eventually agreed to a 10 month settlement freeze in order to re-start the peace 
negotiations with the Palestinians. Netanyahu made clear that the construction freeze did not apply 
to East Jerusalem (Ravid 25/11 2009). Four months later the Interior Minister in Netanyahu’s 
government, Eli Yishai, announced the construction of 1600 new settlements in East Jerusalem just 
hours after Vice President Joe Biden had declared full US support to Israel’s security during his 
visit. The announcement upset the Biden immediately by calling the announcement a destructive 
move by Israel that would undermine the peace talks (Bronner 09/03/2010).  When John Kerry 
launched his framework for future peace negotiations in 2013, Netanyahu decided to start 
constructing 1500 new settlements in East Jerusalem, just days after Israel released Palestinian 
prisoners as part of the deal that John Kerry laid the foundation for (Zahriyeh 30/10/2013).  
     The self-interest of especially Netanyahu in regards to the settlements in the West Bank has 
caused severe damage to the US-Israeli relation, but is nevertheless an inevitable part of politics 
according to Morgenthau (Jackson & Sørensen 2010:69). In the classical theory of Morgenthau the 
political leaders are responsible for the security and welfare of the people they govern. Moreover 
interests of states change over time, which the issue of the settlement during Obama and Netanyahu 
is a clear sign of. Both leaders had their strong opinions about it and went to great lengths to protect 
the interests of their states. Obama saw the settlements as the main obstacle to solving the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict, thus jeopardizing his new foreign policy toward the Middle East. If the US 
would not be able to put pressure on Israel in order to solve the conflict, the visions in Obamas 
Cairo speech would be undermined and cause further distrust against the US. The demands of the 
settlement freeze in the West Bank, and the effort of renewing peace talks with Israel and the 
Palestinians can therefore be argues as being of strategic and personal interest for Obama. For 
Netanyahu the settlements and the military presence of Israeli soldiers in the West Bank served as a 
protector if Israel's security. Morgenthau argues that political leaders 'think and act in terms of 
interests defined as power', which is applicable in the case of the actions taken by Obama and 
Netanyahu on the settlements. Obamas vision of re-building trust between the Muslim world and 
the US was a new approach to securing US influence and presence in the Middle East, can be 
explained through Morgenthau’s theory on power politics. States seek to maximize their power and 
interests, and rational state actors will therefore calculate the cost and benefits of policies in order to 
gain as much power as possible (Julian & Zalta 2010). In this case the Obama administration 
reviewed the cost of pressuring Israel against the benefits of gaining trust and more influence in the 
Middle East. Netanyahu on the other hand saw the settlements as a more important national interest 
that outweighed the benefits of diplomatically pleasing the US. By expanding the settlements in 
both East Jerusalem and the West Bank Netanyahu secured the Israeli presence on Palestinian 
ground and prevented a peace negotiation that could lead to establishing a Palestinian state. In a 
neoclassical realistic approach this means that Netanyahu maximized the power status of Israel by 
securing the power status toward the Palestinians, and thereby preventing Arab states to cooperate 
militarily with a Palestinian state. Unlike Waltz presumption about states behavior being 
subordinated to structure, Morgenthau sees states as the main actors in international politics. In this 
case one can argue that both Obama and Netanyahu proved that states act according to their 
interests, and that their behavior are not bound by structures. The structural change that occurred 
from 2009 to 2015 in the Middle East, as described earlier, was not the reason for the new and 
harsher Israeli stand on the settlements. On the contrary it was the new government led by 
Netanyahu that acted according to self-interest, which led to the decisions on expanding the 
settlements. In Obamas case the pressure that was put on Israel was a calculated act of preserving 
influence in the region and strengthening the ties with the Muslim world. When Netanyahu declared 
that there would be no Palestinian state if he was to be elected Prime Minister in the recent election, 
it was as much an attempt to get voters as it was a signal to the US on the possible future standpoint 
of Israel. Obama slammed Netanyahu’s remark on the Palestinians afterward and said that he 
believed it was against Israel’s interests to use this kind of rhetoric (Arab News 23/03/2015). The 
bad stand between Obama and Netanyahu was not only caused by the negotiations with Iran, but 
just as much as the handling of the settlements. Netanyahu’s decision to build new settlements 
throughout his Prime Minister ship in spite of the effort that the Obama administration put into 
brokering a framework for peace negotiations reveals the self-interest of Israel and its place in the 
anarchy among states. 
      
Conclusion 
 
The notorious alliance between the US and Israel has arguably undergone changes since Yitzhak 
Rabin and Bill Clinton were forerunners for the Oslo Accord. The first Netanyahu government 
marked what would later become an obstacle to peace with the Palestinians, but also the underlying 
differences between the US and Israel that were not always exposed. The circumstances in which 
Israel and the US were to cooperate after 9/11 made the alliance stronger under the leadership of 
George Bush and Ariel Sharon. This project has argued that structural changes in the international 
system can be used to explain the behavior of the units involved (the US and Israel), and that 
offensive realism can explain the decision of both the US and Israel when they went to war in 
respectively Iraq, Afghanistan and Lebanon. The first neo-realistic theory is based on Kenneth 
Waltz presumption about the importance of structures, and the offensive realistic theory is based on 
John Mearsheimer’s argument about states pursuit of regional hegemony and power in general. 
After 9/11 the structures of the international system changed so that an unprecedented enemy 
caused the US to start two wars and cooperate more intensely with Israel against their common 
challenge in the region, namely radical Islam. The stronger ties between the two states meant a 
tendency to be more cooperative on matters that were not of equal national interests, such as the war 
in Lebanon, the building of the security wall in the West Bank, and the withdrawal from Gaza. The 
Lebanon war revealed great support from the US, because of the common enemy that Israel fought. 
It would later show that the war did not serve Israeli interests in the best way, since Hizbollah 
became much stronger and influential in the years to come. The withdrawal from Gaza gave Israel 
international recognition for its diplomatic willingness to meet the requests of the Palestinians. It 
also benefited the US by showing its positive influence on Israel and once again made it the only 
real peace broker between Israel and the Palestinians. The common strategic interests of the US and 
Israel, and the willingness to cooperate closely on fighting terrorism at the time, make the 
discrepancies seem rather unimportant compared to the diplomatic dispute that would come with 
the following administrations.  
     The current relationship between the US and Israel has been called the worst by John McCain, 
Israel’s former ambassador to the US, Michael Oren, and political commentators, Jeffrey Goldberg 
and Peggy Noonan (Weaver 22/03/2015). To explain the current relations and the development 
from Bush and Sharon to Obama and Netanyahu, this project chose to analyze two main events that 
caused the relations to change. Neoclassical realism, with Morgenthau as the main theorist, is used 
to describe the issue of the Israeli settlements that proved to be a sensitive area for both the US and 
Israel. The US demand of an Israeli settlement freeze in 2010 ignited the following years of dispute 
between the US and Israel. Obamas demand revealed the new Middle East approach, which would 
not allow Israel to jeopardize a peace agreement with the Palestinians over the settlements. John 
Kerry’s failure in building a constructive dialogue between Israel and the Palestinians was 
nevertheless a sign of an Israeli government that prioritized self-interests over strong ties with the 
main ally. Neoclassical realism presumes that states are the main actors in the international system, 
and thus behave according to national interests and the pursuit of maximizing power. In the 
settlement case both states acted out of self-interest. The US had its own interest in becoming the 
peace broker that could pressure Israel to significant concessions, and thereby improve the 
reputation of the US in the region. Israel on the other hand had different motives that came along 
with the new government under Netanyahu’s leadership. Israel’s security was once again the top 
national priority and the settlements/military presence in the West Bank was viewed as a safety 
precaution in the eyes of the right wing government. The benefits of keeping the Israeli presence in 
the West Bank clearly outweighed the cost of having the ties with the US damaged.  
      The other event that caused the US and Israel to collide is the ongoing negotiations between the 
world powers and Iran over its nuclear program. Netanyahu has a long history of publically warning 
against a nuclear Iran, which became the other most important agenda in his Prime Minister ship. 
Iran’s alliance with Hizbollah, Hamas and Syria is clearly a threat to Israel’s security. The nuclear 
program has therefore been seen as an existential threat to Israel’s security, not only by Netanyahu 
but also by Israeli politicians from both the left and right wing. His campaign against Iran 
influenced the world powers to sanction Iran in order to pressure it into signing a deal that would 
prevent a possible nuclear bomb. A framework for such a deal was signed in 2015 but its content 
was widely criticized by Netanyahu. In order to understand the differences in the US and Israel’s 
assessment of the Iranian threat, neorealism is once again used to explain how structures affect state 
units behavior. Israel does not only see a nuclear Iran as a threat, it is just as much a threat to see 
Iran become a regional hegemon if a future deal will legitimize Iran as a rational power in the 
region. The changing structures of the region have made Iran an important player in the clash 
between Sunnis and Shias. This has caused Israel, and namely the Netanyahu government to fear 
that a nuclear deal with Iran will result in a positive relation between the US and Iran. If Iran 
becomes a peace broker in the region it will automatically give it the regional power status that it 
strives for. The current US-Israeli relationship has suffered because of the different national 
interests that evolved as a result of the changing structures, and because the self-interest of states 
will arguably expose the vulnerability of even the strongest alliances.  
 
 Discussion 
 
This chapters aims at discussin the costs and benefits of the US-Israeli relationship, by asking if 
there is a balance of interests between the US and Israel in their relation. The debate about the costs 
and benefits for US in keeping the massive economic, military and diplomatic support for Israel is a 
debate that divides scholars and politicians as any other debate does. ‘Intelligence squared’ hosts 
one of the popular debates, where the question asked is whether or not US should step back from its 
special relationship with Israel. There is no doubt about the major intelligence source that Israel 
provides the US, nor is there any doubt that the geopolitical interests of the US in having a strong 
ally to protect its interests is valuable. There is however enormous costs involved which the Obama 
administration seems to have had in mind when the new Middle East approach was formed. By 
reaching out to the Muslim world and pressuring Israel to concessions the US tried to rebuild and 
strengthen the relations to the Arab states. The nuclear threat from Iran has made US allies such as 
Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Israel worry about the 'soft' approach toward Iran. At the recent Camp 
David summit with leaders of the Gulf, the goal was to secure US allies that it can rely on US 
support in case of external threats (Saab & Pavel 12/05/2015). The no-show of Saudi Arabia’s new 
King Salman revealed the Saudi dissatisfaction with Washinton’s policy against Iran and Syria 
(Bar'el b 12/05/2015). The explanation of the Obama administration regarding the handling of Iran 
and Syria is not enough, neither for Saudi Arabia nor Israel. Even though Israel and Saudi Arabia 
are not allies they have common interests and enemies that Washington has not supported and 
protected them from (Orkaby 13/03/2015). At least that is what the two states express and signal 
with the political actions taken, as per the no-show of King Salman at Camp David, and 
Netanyahu’s speech in the US Congress in 2015. Another common fear that Saudi Arabia and Israel 
share is that once the sanctions against Iran will be lifted, Iran will buy military technology from 
Russia and China. The fear was confirmed when Vladimir Putin lifted a ban on supplying Iran with 
S-300 air-defense missile system as soon as the nuclear deal with Iran was made. Russia's main 
nuclear negotiator, Sergei Shoigu, called for the lifting of the arms embargo when a final deal is 
made, yet another sign of Russia's interest in engaging with arms trade to Iran (The Economist b 
16/05/2015). 
     In the 'Intelligence squared' debate in the US, Middle East scholar Rashid Khalidi and columnist 
for The New York Times, Roger Cohen, argue that the geopolitical interest in supporting Israel is 
overrated and has a damaging influence on US interests. The diplomatic protection of Israel in the 
UN makes the US unpopular in both the UN but more importantly in the Middle East. The US veto 
protection that Israel benefits from prevent the establishment of a Palestinian state, which is a tense 
issue in the Arab world. One of the arguments made against the US support of Israel is that the 
hatred against the US in the Middle East becomes more intense and puts US security at risk, giving 
terrorist more reason to hit US targets. In addition, as this project argues, Israel has its own policy 
and national interests that supersede the common interests, loyalty and cooperation between the US 
and Israel. But should the US give in to hatred and threats, and abandon the closest ally in the 
region? Former chief negotiator with Syria, Itamar Rabinovich and Deputy Secretary of the 
Treasury in the Clinton adminstration, Stuart Eizenstat, are among those who oppose abandoning 
the alliance with Israel. They argue that the shared values between the US and Israel are much more 
important than pleasing the Arab states. The US and Israel have common enemies, share invaluable 
intelligence and cooperate militarily and on scientific knowledge. Most important is the fact that 
Israel is the most democratic country in the region, which has been a value that the US fought wars 
to promote. On the long run the US can rely on Israel in fighting common enemies, as it did in the 
second Lebanon war against Hizbollah, and the shared intelligence on fx terrorist plots against the 
US is an aspect that should be considered of high priority. As argued earlier the relationship 
between the US and Israel is at a break point, which makes the debate more relevant than ever. 
When a new government in the US will elected in 2016, its foreign policy toward the Middle East 
alongside the future developments in the region, will be crucial to the future US-Israeli relationship. 
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